The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. (...) To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos : Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K. (shrink)

In this series of four lectures a scientist examines some philosophical implications of what one might loosely call "the modern scientific view of life". Bronowski has produced numerous books and articles on everything from the poetry of Blake to the clock paradox of relativity theory. It is therefore to be regretted that his latest work suffers from an annoying amount of oversimplification, and a tendency to substitute rhapsodizing for reasoning. Those concerned with the "two cultures" debate and related matters will (...) nevertheless find this book valuable and enjoyable, especially for the author's argument—which is convincing—that science and the arts need not be antithetical either in subject-matter or in spirit.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This book is an anthology of various approaches to the dream and its significance, from neurophysiological, anthropological, religious, sociological, and psychological points of view. Articles in it range from extremely technical and sophisticated to rather nebulous and rambling. The phenomenon of dreaming has long perplexed man. Various approaches to it have been attempted, from the occult interpretation of dreams as signifying and portending future events, to the psychoanalytical interpretation as representing, in part, past occurrences in the life history of the (...) dreamer, to the neurophysiological investigations which correlate the electrical events of the present dream-state with other physiological and neural changes. All of the above approaches are represented in this volume. In addition, this book covers a wide spectrum of contemporary research into this problem. While not sufficiently comprehensive coverage is given to any particular aspect of dream research, it serves as a general guide to present avenues of dream investigations. Most of the essays contained therein are not too technical for the interested lay reader to comprehend.—L. P. K. (shrink)

Russell writes with wit, candor, and uncommon honesty about his Victorian childhood, his painful adolescence, and his extracurricular amorous conquests. On the credit side, it must be said that it offers a remarkable insight into the development of a remarkable man. But for the benefit of those with more than a casual interest in the philosopher named Bertrand Russell, it should be mentioned that this book suffers from chronic intellectual malnutrition. Not that there isn't a lot of name-dropping and folksy (...) correspondence between the intellectual giants of the early twentieth century. There is a perfectly mad letter from Georg Cantor, who refers to Kant as "this abominable mummy"; and a perfectly charming one from Norbert Weiner's father, who, by way of introduction, states that his son has studied philosophy under "professors Royce, Perry, Palmer, Munsterberg, Schmidt, Holt, etc." In a delicious jest, Russell adds as a footnote, "Nevertheless he turned out well." There is, however, nothing substantial about philosophy in this book. At its close, Russell had completed Principia. He had returned to Cambridge already a most important figure in philosophy and mathematics. But there is no real discussion of the ideas which led up to and leavened this period in Russell's life. There is instead the dreary story of Whitehead's financial troubles. One hopes that a proper sense of the importance of things will be restored in future volumes of Russell's autobiography.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This book about philosophical and methodological problems in psychoanalytic theory is surely one of the best pieces of literature on this subject of recent vintage. The author, a psychiatrist on the faculty of Harvard Medical School, displays considerable logical skill and philosophical sophistication, in addition to the expected familiarity with the psychoanalytic literature. The major purport of the book is a logical and philosophical defense of the claim that psychoanalytic explanations of human behavior--if constructed with proper and adequate regard for (...) relevant clinical data--are methodologically sound and genuinely scientific. One useful and novel feature of Sherwood's argument is the particular type of illustrative case material which he employs: instead of mustering various bits and instances of behavior from large numbers and varieties of cases, Sherwood considers the psychiatric explanation actually given by Freud in one of his recorded clinical case histories--the famous "Karl Lorenz" or "rat man" case. Sherwood devotes two chapters to a detailed description of this case, and an analysis of the logic of Freud's explanations of the behavior presented therein. From the point of view of logical and methodological considerations, there is an obvious advantage in such an approach, for it enables the critic to avoid leveling charges against the theory which might originate simply from extracting portions of explanatory material from their proper context. Sherwood also includes a chapter of criticism of what he calls "the thesis of the separate domain"--the view that there are fundamental differences in the logic of explanations of human behavior, cognition, and other phenomena involving reasons and intentions on the one hand, and other forms of explanation characteristic of the physical sciences, on the other. Philosophically, this is the most mature chapter of the book, and will be of interest to philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of science, particularly for its criticism of the views of R. S. Peters. Unfortunately, however, Sherwood's argument is not unmarred by serious flaws and deficiencies. These include a highly psychologistic analysis of the logic and structure of explanation whose subsequent use repeatedly involves the author in context-of-discovery vs. context-of-justification confusions. Moreover, an apparent lapse into a non-Humean account of causality in the second section of the fifth chapter leads Sherwood to an unfortunate petitio principii on the issue of causes vs. reasons. Sherwood's critical discussion of the classical "covering-law" model of scientific explanation in the penultimate chapter exhibits numerous failures to come to grips with the essential aspects of the Braithwaite-Hempel-Oppenheim theory. Finally, an important sin of omission: Sherwood completely ignores the highly germane and decisive issues raised by authors such as Nagel and Arthur Pap, who charge the theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis with lack of cognitive and empirical significance. In sum, this is a flawed but eminently worthwhile book in the philosophy of behavioral science.--H. P. K. (shrink)

By studying afresh the "act of explanation," the author hopes to achieve a reconciliation of diverse methodologies. Man's own personal being is to be taken as the clue to the nature of our "ultimate explanatory forms."--P. K. J.

As the title indicates, Sprague’s book is concerned with the "theoretical background" of Plato’s conception of the philosopher-king. This theoretical intention is explained in the preface to consist in focusing on the philosopher-king "as man of art or science, rather than as head of state". It is never quite clear in her account, however, how such a distinction between a theoretical and a political framework is justified. As Sprague’s own discussion in the later portions of the book testifies, the philosophical (...) statesman’s art cannot really be separated from his function as the head of a state. (shrink)

Background: Concern has been expressed about the process of consent to clinical trials, particularly in phase I “first-in-man” trials. Trial participant information sheets are often lengthy and technical. Content-based readability testing of sheets, which is often required to obtain research ethics approval for trials in the USA, is limited and cannot indicate how information will perform. Methods: An independent-groups design was used to study the user-testing performance of the participant information sheet from the phase I TGN1412 trial. Members of the (...) public were asked to read it, then find and demonstrate understanding of 21 key aspects of the trial. The participant information sheet was then rewritten, redesigned and tested on 20 members of the public, using the same 21-item questionnaire. Results: On the original TGN1412 participant information sheet, participants could not find answers and some of the found information was not understood. Six of 21 questions, including those relating to placebo, follow-up visits and the emergency phone number, were found by eight or fewer of 10 participants. The revised information sheet performed better, with the answers to 17 of 21 questions found and understood by all 20 participants. Conclusions: Tests showed that the TGN1412 participant information sheet may not inform participants adequately for consent. Revising its content and design led to significant improvements. Writers of materials for trial participants should take account of good practice in information design. Performance-based user testing may be a useful method to indicate strengths and weaknesses in trial materials. (shrink)

The past decades have seen a growing “philosophical” interest in a number of authors, but strangely enough Saramago’s oeuvre has been left somewhat aside. This volume aims at filling this gap by providing a diverse range of philosophical perspectives and expositions on Saramago’s work. The chapters explore some possible issues arising from his works: from his use of Plato’s allegory of the cave to his re-readings of Biblical stories; from his critique and “reinvention” of philosophy of history to his allegorical (...) exploration of alternative histories; from his humorous approach to our being-towards-death to the revolutionary political charge of his fiction. The essays here confront Saramago’s fiction with concepts, theories, and suggestions belonging to various philosophical traditions and philosophers including Plato, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Freud, Benjamin, Heidegger, Lacan, Foucault, Patočka, Derrida, Agamben, and Žižek. (shrink)

In this essay, a Jewish thinker argues that the world as depicted by science forms a single system: each part is related to all because all are related to a single knower; this single system constitutes a whole which has priority over its parts because it conditions or delimits their behavior. This totality is the unchanging source of all processes, all making actual what had been merely possible. This totality Kohn attempts to define as God, and, taking it for granted (...) that science depicts the universe as undergoing continuous evolution on the whole and within its parts, he attempts to show how such evolution reveals, in the human perspective, that God is creativity. He distinguishes three "levels of being" produced in the course of the cosmic evolution--inorganic matter, sensitivity, conscience--but denies that the arising of any one of these phases involves the super-addition of something new to the preceding ones. He argues that this notion of God answers all religious requirements, and concludes with a warning and a plea regarding the possibility of future evolution in the light of man's ability to exercise conscious control over events.--K. P. F. (shrink)

The relations between physical science and technology, and their implications for culture, are investigated. Van Melsen argues that physical science merely extends, though in an abstract manner, man's ordinary methods of gaining knowledge about the world, that science and technology require one another, and that while science and technology threaten to overcome man's control of them, they also offer a great opportunity and stimulus to man's further self-realization.--K. P. F.

As part of an attempt to reconcile Indian philosophy and Western science, the author here maintains that the methods and theories of contemporary science support idealism rather than materialism. He holds that the world is a primal, undifferentiated field of energy, itself indeterminate and inexpressible, which man conceptually distinguishes in ways determined by "the genetic habit of the race."--K. P. F.

The earlier volume in this series dealt with two religions of Indian origin, namely, Buddhism and Jainism. The Indian religious scene, however, is characterized by not only religions which originated in India but also by religions which entered India from outside India and made their home here. Thus religious life in India has been enlivened throughout its history by the presence of religions of foreign origin on its soil almost from the very time they came into existence. This volume covers (...) three such religions—Zoraoastrianism, Judaism, and Islam. In the case of Zoraostianism, even its very beginnings are intertwined with India, as Zoroastrianism reformed a preexisting religion which had strong links to the Vedic heritage of India. This relationship took on a new dimension when a Zoroastrian community, fearing persecution in Persia after its Arab conquest, sought shelter in western India and ultimately went on to produce India’s pioneering nationalist in the figure of Dadabhai Naoroji ( 1825-1917), also known as the Grand Old Man of India. Jews found refuge in south India after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70 C.E. and have remained a part of the Indian religious scene since then, some even returning to Israel after it was founded in 1948. Islam arrived in Kerala as soon as it was founded and one of the earliest mosques in the history of Islam is found in India. Islam differs from the previously mentioned religions inasmuch as it went on to gain political hegemony over parts of the country for considerable periods of time, which meant that its impact on the religious life of the subcontinent has been greater compared to the other religions. It has also meant that Islam has existed in a religiously plural environment in India for a longer period than elsewhere in the world so that not only has Islam left a mark on India, India has also left its mark on it. Indeed all the three religions covered in this volume share this dual feature, that they have profoundly influenced Indian religious life and have also in turn been profoundly influenced by their presence in India. (shrink)

The earlier volume in this series dealt with two religions of Indian origin, namely, Buddhism and Jainism. The Indian religious scene, however, is characterized by not only religions which originated in India but also by religions which entered India from outside India and made their home here. Thus religious life in India has been enlivened throughout its history by the presence of religions of foreign origin on its soil almost from the very time they came into existence. This volume covers (...) three such religions—Zoraoastrianism, Judaism, and Islam. In the case of Zoraostianism, even its very beginnings are intertwined with India, as Zoroastrianism reformed a preexisting religion which had strong links to the Vedic heritage of India. This relationship took on a new dimension when a Zoroastrian community, fearing persecution in Persia after its Arab conquest, sought shelter in western India and ultimately went on to produce India’s pioneering nationalist in the figure of Dadabhai Naoroji ( 1825-1917), also known as the Grand Old Man of India. Jews found refuge in south India after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70 C.E. and have remained a part of the Indian religious scene since then, some even returning to Israel after it was founded in 1948. Islam arrived in Kerala as soon as it was founded and one of the earliest mosques in the history of Islam is found in India. Islam differs from the previously mentioned religions inasmuch as it went on to gain political hegemony over parts of the country for considerable periods of time, which meant that its impact on the religious life of the subcontinent has been greater compared to the other religions. It has also meant that Islam has existed in a religiously plural environment in India for a longer period than elsewhere in the world so that not only has Islam left a mark on India, India has also left its mark on it. Indeed all the three religions covered in this volume share this dual feature, that they have profoundly influenced Indian religious life and have also in turn been profoundly influenced by their presence in India. (shrink)

On the analogy of the colloquial register in some modern languages, where narrative and argument may be punctuated by oaths and exclamations (sometimes obscene or blasphemous) in order to maintain a high affective level and compel the hearer's attention, it is reasonable to postulate that Attic conversation also was punctuated by oaths, that this ingredient in comic language was drawn from life, and that the comparative frequency of ║ (|)M M(M) Δ in comedy is sufficiently explained thereby. There are obvious (...) affinities between some passages of comedy, relaxed conversation in Plato and Xenophon, and the forceful, man-to-man tone which Demosthenes sometimes adopts to such good effect (e.g. xxi 209). Compare, for instance, Ar.V.133 f.ἔστιν δ' ⋯νομα ⋮ τῷ μ⋯ν γέροντι ⋮ Φιλοκλέων / να⋯ μ⋯ Δία, τῷ δ' υἱεῖ κτλ., where the oath is a response to imagined incredulity, and X.Smp.4.27αὐτ⋯ν δ⋯ σέ, ἔɸη, ⋯γὼ εἶδον να⋯ μ⋯ τ⋯ν Ἀπόλλω, ὅτε κτλ. (‘Oh, yes, I did!’).It is also important that the commonest oaths fit, in most of their forms, the end of an iambic trimeter:(να⋯) μ⋯ τ⋯ν Δία, ν⋯ (τ⋯ν) Δία,ν⋯ τούς θεούς, μ⋯ τοὺς θεούς. Add that in Aristophanic dialogue (by contrast with Menander) over half the iambic trimeters end with major pause, and half the remainder with minor pause, and we can see why Δ / established itself early as a distinctive comic pattern. Out of 105 examples ofM M(M) Δ cited from comedy in Section II above, 59 have the oath at verse-end.In the case ofπάνυ, which was almost exclusively Attic and — to judge from its great rarity in tragedy — felt by Athenian poets to be prosaic, we lack evidence on its functions in the colloquial register; it may or may not have served as affective punctuation. In prose, we have to reckon with the fact thatπ MπandMππconstituted a genuine stylistic choice (cf. n. 32) as far back as the evidence will take us, since the two earliest instances in prose are [X.]Ath.2.3πάνυ δι⋯ χρείανand ibid. 3.5πολλ⋯ ἔτι πάνυ. The oath, as treated by the comic poets on the basis of colloquial usage, is bound to have served as a model forπάνυ, exerting an influence which pulledπάνυto the end of the verse, but there was also a powerful metrical constraint. As a dibrach ending in a vowel which could not be elided or enter into crasis,πάνυwas especially appropriate for verse-end. That in itself was enough both to establishMππas the dominant pattern in comedy and to promoteMπ…π. Out of the total of 104 examples ofMπ(…)πin comedy, 93 haveπάνυat verse-end, which makesMπ(…)π/ one of the hallmarks of comic style.Mπ…πdoes not occur in prose in association with any other feature identified as colloquial, but it should be noted that Aiskhines and Demosthenes are much fonder ofMππthan other prose authors. In some cases one can see that the orderMππavoids a succession of short syllables (e.g. D. xviii 130, liv 1) or hiatus (e.g. D. xxx 36) or both (e.g. D. xliii 10), but there are other cases in which it has the opposite effect (e.g. D. xxiv 140, xliii 53). The possibility of comic influence on oratorical language cannot be dismissed out of hand. It is also possible that someone will find positive determinants which will explain all the cases ofMππin prose.σɸόδρα, which, likeπάνυ, is peculiarly Attic, is metrically more tractable thanπάνυ, since it can be elided; even so, out of the 80 comic examples ofMσ(…) σ no less than 58 haveσɸόδραat verse-end, and of those 58 there are 22 at major pause, 8 at presumed major pause and 9 at minor pause. The comic treatment ofσɸόδραis thus comparable with the treatment ofπάνυ, and Timokles (CGFP) 222(b).4τηρεῖν…σɸόδραis in fact the closest analogy we have to Ar.Pl.234 f.ἄχθομαι…πάνυ.δέandγάρare a different matter, and in some significant respects different from each other. Postponement ofδέis especially prominent in Aeschylus (45 examples, including a few in which the text is suspect) and then abundant in fourth-century comedy. It is much less common in Euripides (18 examples), rare in Sophocles (6) and Aristophanes (6), and virtually limited in prose to the categories which I labelled (l)–(3). There is as yet no evidence to associate postponement ofδέwith colloquial language; on the contrary, it seems to have begun as a feature of poetic language and to have been taken up and exploited by fourth-century comedy. If, in addition to being Aeschylean, it was colloquial in the fourth century, what happened to it afterwards? Except for such an isolated and inexplicable case as Diod. xx85.1 (v.l.!) — in a military narrative — it is not a feature of the Koine at literary, documentary or subliterate level.Postponement ofγάρwas no doubt encouraged by postponement ofδέ, but it is not itself notably poetic (20 examples in tragedy, of which only three come in my class (5)). One can see how it could possibly have developed in the spoken language of the fourth century, extending the function ofγάρas an explanatory particle (rather on the lines ofγε) in a way which makes it comparable with the English ‘you see’ in (e.g.) ‘He didn't dare pick it up. He hurt his back last year, you see’. For an extension of this kind we may compare the current extension of the English genitive affix in (I heard both examples a year or two ago) ‘Then the girl whose place she was taking's mother turned up’ and ‘The man that Christopher liked's Introduction is much better’. Moreover, postponedγάρappears in a segment of conversation constructed in indirect speech by Theophrastus inChar.8.9τ⋯ πρ⋯γμα βο⋯σθαι γάρ(p C N γάρ). Again we must ask: what happened to it afterwards? A couple of cases in Theophrastus' botanical works (CPiii 11.3 andHPiv 6.1) could be a reflex of the influence of comedy on literary language at Athens. The influence was plainly short-lived, since it did not affect the Koine.It is not hard to see why serious poetry in the fifth century and earlier should have experimented occasionally with the postponement ofδέandγάρ: treatment ofM M qas a valid alternative toM q Mis metrically very convenient. No poet, however, could afford to use common words in a bizarre, un-Greek way merely to save himself time and trouble in constructing a verse. Linguistic innovation is normally analogical, proceeding by extension from a starting-point already there, and the most obvious starting-point for postponement ofδέandγάρis constituted by my class (3). This consideration provides comic postponement with a pedigree, but does not deny it individuality. The remarkable scale and frequency with which comedy exploited a phenomenon which tragedy used with restraint and prose hardly at all gives comic postponement the right to be regarded as a quite distinctive artificial feature of comedy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 523 Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book A of the Metaphysics. By Leo Elders. (Assen, The Netherlands: Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1972) In 1961 Leo Elders published a book under the title Aristotle's Theory o] the One with the subtitle "A Commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics." Five years later he published Aristotle's Cosmology, subtitled "A Commentary on the De Caelo." Continuing his "commentary " approach to (...) Aristotle's works, he returns in the present work to the Metaphysics, restricting himself in this case to an examination of Book Lambda. The author is convinced that the "central doctrine of the Book is the conception of an unmoved Mover, who is unchangeable and eternal; his being is subsistent thinking; he is the final cause of all movement and the Good desired by the cosmos" (p. 1). In addition to a detailed commentary on each of the ten chapters of Book Lambda, the book contains seven introductory chapters which discuss the relation of Aristotle's theology to that of his Greek predecessors, particularly Plato, and attempts to solve such problems as the date and structure of Metaphysics Lambda and its place in the Aristotelian corpus. The author believes Metaphysics Lambda to be a collection of short studies which belong to mature Aristotelianism but do not form a coherent treatise. Because the eighth chapter asserts a multiplicity of Unmoved Movers, which runs counter to the position taken in the rest of the book, Elders takes the position that the eighth chapter is a short essay by one of Aristotle's collaborators or students which was inserted into the book by a later editor. One of the significant difficulties with the book is that the author reads a number of anachronistic ideas back into Greek philosophy. He assumes that we all know, especially the author himself, what "theology" means to the Greeks and that whatever its meaning it is not only continuous with the Christian conception of theology but can best be understood with the aid of the Christian approach to theology. Is it not best to regard the Unmoved Mover simply as the Perfect Scientist or Perfect Knower, the final cause of those who desire knowledge? Of course, it is true that Aristotle refers to the Unmoved Mover as divine (theos)----what,after all, deserves the designation "divine" except that which is perfect and eternal, and the final goal of man's intellectual activity? As the author states in the Preface that "one of the leading thoughts of the commentary is that there is a real continuity between Academic theories and Aristotle's doctrine of the Unmoved Mover" he devotes considerable attention to various aspects of Plato's thought. Here he frequently succumbs to the temptation to read a number of Neoplatonic, Pythagorean, and even Christian ideas into the Greek philosopher, and fails to distinguish Plato from "the Platonists" mentioned by Aristotle (el. pp. 276, 291, and 292). Such passages as Metaphysics 1090b20-24 and 1090b31 ft. do not necessarily refer to Plato himself but could easily mean some unidentified members of his school. In the introductory chapters especially, Elders attributes to Plato a number of theories which derive from other sources, frequently with little or no direct textual justification for so doing. For instance, he says that "a great number of texts indicate that Plato made the One a principle beyond being, and thus beyond thinking" (p. 16). His only corroborating evidence is that this is "implicitly contained in the famous text of Rep. 509B" (footnote 7, p. 16). Earlier he has said that "Plato developed a theory of principles according to which all essences are connected with the supreme principle, which, in his later years, Plato called the One" (pp. 8-9). Again, the only textual evidence he mentions is several passages from the Republic, which have at best a tenuous connection with such a theory and which were certainly not written during Plato's "later years." The book also suffers from a number of organizational problems. In an attempt to bring together the opinions of other scholars on the issues at hand, the author continually mixes up secondary literature and interpretations with the problems he poses... (shrink)

PART I. -- 1. The Asian, European and the American views on destiny -- 2. Biblical fulfilment of destiny -- 3. Destiny in the Ghanaian context -- 4. Mystical effects of names on destiny -- PART II. -- 5. My childhood days and primary education -- 6. My secondary education -- 7. University education -- 8. Employment after graduation, mariage life and children -- 9. Post-graduate studies at the University of Strathclyde, Glascgow, Scotland and working experience -- 10. Resignation from (...) Cocoa processing company and employment at Tema Food Complex Corportion -- 11. Appointment as the manaing director of cocoa processing company, achievements, awards and honours received -- 12. Mysterious occurrences in my life and my wife's miraculous healing -- 13. Do you believe in fasting, prayers and dreams? -- 14. Conclusion. (shrink)

Using covariant derivatives and the operator definitions of quantum mechanics, gauge invariant Proca and Lehnert equations are derived and the Lorenz condition is eliminated in U(1) invariant electrodynamics. It is shown that the structure of the gauge invariant Lehnert equation is the same in an O(3) invariant theory of electrodynamics.

Scientists in many fields are presently giving the closest attention to study of the potentials of the systems approach for understanding what cannot be comprehended with the analytical approach or, as V. A. Engel'gardt has put it, "an accumulation of material in reduced form." This approach is in some degree a gesture of despair. It is quite obvious that we now face the danger of drowning in the abundance of data accumulated in terms of "special" problems not tied into a (...) system, and that this threatens loss of general direction. (shrink)

It would be difficult to name a more interesting scientific problem than that of knowledge of the brain, its overall mechanisms and its molecular nature. Rational management of the brain in the future and utilization of the principles of its functioning to construct various mechanisms to undergird present-day technological progress should follow as direct consequences of development of that sphere of knowledge.

There is a practical five-step method of ethics dialog developed by John Woolman, an 18th c. businessman and ethical activist, that was used by Robert K. Greenleaf, a 20th c. A.T.&T. Corporate Vice-President, that includes: (a) friendly, emotive affect; (b) discussion of mutual commonalities; (c) discussion of issue entanglements; (d) discussion of potential experimental solutions; and, (e) trial and feedback discussion. This method of dialog appears to proceed with a type of consciousness considered by John Woolman and Bernard Lonergan as (...) one where the I is conscious that I and Others are part of a more foundational, larger and prior We. This type of dialog is different than Socratic dialog. The corresponding type of consciousness is different than the more derivative, e.g., two allies being united in their response to a common goal. It is also different than Buber's I and Thou appreciative consciounsess of the interestingness, value, diversity, and uniqueness of others. Woolman dialog as seen in four cases appears to be a concrete method that has some value both as an end in itself and as instrumental means that can: be issue effective, help build ethical organization/community culture, and help facilitate peaceful, evolutionary change and development. Limitations of the method are also considered. The method may also be a several hundred year anticipation of experiment based pragmatist philosophy that is anthropologically sensitive to cultural entanglements. No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe, ... Each is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.... John Donne (17th c.). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Interpreting the MengziPhilip J. IvanhoeMencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Edited by Alan K. L. Chan. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002. Pp. vii + 328. Hardcover $51.00.Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, edited by Alan K. L. Chan, is an important collection of essays from a scholarly conference held at the National University of Singapore in 1999. It begins with a concise yet incisive introduction to Mengzi, his work, and the various (...) contributions to the volume. The essays engage the Mengzi from a wide range of perspectives and employ a variety of different approaches. One of its many virtues is the inclusion of articles that explore the relationship of the text to recently excavated Guodian material. The primary audience of these essays is other scholars. However, several contributions could be understood and appreciated by nonspecialists as well.In the lead essay, Ning Chen criticizes a wide range of current accounts concerning the background of Mengzi's theory of human nature and argues that because of these mistaken impressions about Mengzi's intellectual context contemporary scholars fail to appreciate important features of Mengzi's own theory. Chen argues that in order to understand Mengzi's theory it is necessary to appreciate that he was responding to a heretofore unnoticed Mohist theory of human nature and to views that we find in certain Guodian texts. Both of these sources describe "inegalitarian" theories of human nature, and such theories served as a central focus of not only Mengzi's but Xunzi's theory of human nature as well.Some may find Chen's claims about the Mohist theory of human nature in need of further support. His evidence is a single passage from the later, dialectical chapters and the reading of this passage remains highly controversial. Given the importance of this issue for Mengzi and the significant debates Mengzi has with Mohists in various places in the Mengzi, it is quite strange that we see no direct reference to this theory in the text, nor do we find evidence of it in the core chapters of the Mozi. Chen argues that his interpretation is superior to that of Wu Yujing, who argues that the Mohists advocated the view that human nature was ethically neutral. However, Chen does not mention that others have produced quite impressive arguments in support of this same conclusion, for example David S. Nivison.Chen presents interesting and impressive textual work on Guodian texts and no one can deny that this material adds to our understanding of early Chinese philosophy. However, it is not yet clear how, if at all, these texts change our interpretation of Mengzi's theory itself. Even on the issue of what motivated thinkers like Mengzi [End Page 249] and Xunzi to argue for more "egalitarian" theories, it is not clear that Chen has identified anything strikingly new. While the Guodian texts do describe new and interesting theories concerning the character of human nature, these are not the first "inegalitarian" theories. Perhaps more important, one need not see thinkers like Mengzi as responding only or even primarily to explicit theories about human nature; there was ample motivation to argue for a fundamental moral equality among human beings in order to resist the inertia of hereditary rule. As Donald Munro argued in his classic work, The Concept of Man in Early China, this is a distinctive feature of early Chinese thought. It seems reasonable to believe that on some not-too-deep level, all these theories about human nature were responding to the political and social realities of the times.I have some concern about Chen's tendency, which is common among those working on Guodian material, to infer direct causal influence between these texts and later philosophical writings. As all philosophers know, inference is a tricky affair. If we find an earlier culture A, whose members wore trousers with two legs, and a later culture B, whose members also wore trousers with two legs, we might be led to infer that B picked up this practice from A. This would be rash. Both may have adopted the practice from a third culture C or each may have come upon the idea independently—after all, they... (shrink)